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IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE: Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417
U.S. 62 (1974).
INTRODUCTION
A question of continuing interest to those in the export industry,
and to the states in which those industries are located, is the Supreme
Court's determination of when the constitutional immunity from tax-
ation, guaranteed by the Import-Export Clause,' attaches to export
items. This issue has recently been re-addressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co. 2
National Cash Register (NCR) is a large manufacturer of data
processing systems, accounting machines and cash registers, which
has its main production facilities and warehouses in Dayton, Ohio.'
For marketing purposes NCR is divided into two divisions, domestic
and international, each wholly separate from the other.' The instant
case concerns the latter division.
NCR maintains no inventory of machines to meet foreign de-
mand. 5 When the international division receives an order, the ma-
chines are built specifically to meet the particular needs of that cus-
tomer. After manufacture and inspection, the order is crated and
taken to a warehouse in Dayton to await shipment, which often en-
tails considerable delay.' The machines involved in Kosydar were
awaiting shipment on December 31, 1967 when Ohio's tax commis-
sioner assessed a personal property tax on them.
NCR appealed the assessment to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals,
claiming the machines were exports and thus immune from taxation
under the Import-Export Clause of the Constitution. NCR sought to
prove that, due to their unique design, the machines could not be
diverted to the domestic market, that no machine had ever been
The author wishes to thank Ms. Maryann B. Gall of the Attorney General of
Ohio's office and Mr. Ralph B. Lake of the Legal Department of NCR Corporation,
for their assistance in the preparation of this paper. Of course any errors or omissions
are the author's.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. "No State shall without the Consent of Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its Inspection laws .
2. 417 U.S. 62 (1974).
3. Total revenue for 1973 was $1,816,282,000. Revenue from international opera-
tions was $895,430,000. 1973 NCR ANNUAL REPORT 26 n.2.
4. 417 U.S. at 63.
5. Id.
6. Several reasons account for the delays. At times the importing nations require
shipment of full orders only, which means storage until the full production run is
complete. Difficulties in obtaining import licenses and uncertainties in the interna-
tional monetary system also cause delays. 417 U.S. at 62 n.1.
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diverted to the domestic market, and that no foreign purchaser had
ever returned a machine to NCR.' The Board upheld the Commis-
sioner's ruling that the immunity from taxation did not attach to
exports until they actually commenced their journey to the foreign
market. As these goods were not yet in the stream of export, they
reasoned, the immunity had not yet attached.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed,' holding that the evidence
showed a certainty of export9 which rendered irrelevant the fact that
the machines were still in storage on the date of assessment. How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that with-
out some movement into the stream of export, the immunity did not
attach.
The decision in Kosydar is based upon a rule propounded nearly
80 years ago.'0 Since that early ruling the realities of trade have
changed dramatically, as has the involvement of the Federal govern-
ment in the regulation of trade. These changes necessitate a modifi-
cation of the somewhat mechanistic test applied by the Court
through the adoption and use of more flexible criteria, so as to accom-
modate present day needs. This note will attempt to show that the
test applied in Kosydar may lead to ambiguity and inconsistency,
rather than the clarity sought by the Court. Policy arguments will be
presented in favor of a more flexible, rational rule.
THE EXPORT TEST
The seminal case on the export tax question is Coe v. Errol,"
wherein Coe and others cut logs to be floated from New Hampshire
to Maine for processing. While the logs were stored awaiting spring
high water, the city of Errol assessed a tax on them. Coe protested,
arguing the tax was one on interstate commerce and a violation of the
Export Clause of the Constitution. The tax was upheld by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the United States Supreme
Court, viewed the question as whether
7. 417 U.S. at 64 n.6. The custom built nature of the machines limits their diver-
sion potential. Different nations have different characters and decimal placements
which require unique keyboards, printing mechanisms and so forth. The machines are
also often wired for use with electrical systems not available in the United States. More
advanced American merchandising techniques also tend to render machines manufac-
tured to meet foreign needs inappropriate for American use.
8. National Cash Register Co. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 166, 298 N.E.2d 559
(1973).
9. 298 N.E.2d at 562.
10. Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
11. Id.
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the owner's state of mind in relation to the goods, that is his intent to
export them, and his partial preparation to do so, exempt the goods from
taxation. 2
Answering the question in the negative, Justice Bradley defined the
point at which goods ceased to be part of the mass of goods in the
state, that is when goods become exports.
Such goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the
State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual
way, until they have been shipped or entered with a common carrier for
the transportation in a continuous route or journey.3
Since Coe's logs had not yet commenced their final journey, it was
determined the immunity did not attach. This is the rule the Court
has followed since the Coe decision. 4
The Court in Kosydar rejected the certainty of export test, ac-
cepted by the Ohio court, for a test which requires certainty as well
as entrance into the stream of export.15 While conceding that the
goods in question would be used for export,"6 the Court reasoned that
to grant the immunity despite a lack of movement into the stream of
export required too sharp a departure from the settled line of cases
beginning with Coe. 7 To answer criticism that the decision repre-
sented a wooden or mechanistic application of Coe, the Court said:
[T]his is an instance, however, where we believe simplicity has its vir-
tues. The Court recognized long ago that even if it is not an easy matter
to set down a rule determining the moment when articles obtain the
protection of the Import-Export Clause, "it is highly important both to
the shipper and to the state that it should be clearly defined so as to avoid
all ambiguity or question." [citation omitted]"
The rule of Coe has led the Court to limit its inquiry to the factual
matters involved to determine whether
sufficient commencement of the process of export has occurred so as to
immunize the article at issue from state taxation."
THE RULE OF REASON
By limiting itself to a factual determination, it can be argued
that the Court failed to consider several realities of trade. Further,
while striving to prevent ambiguity, the Court has effectively created
12. Id. at 525.
13. Id. at 527.
14. See, e.g., Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, 337 U.S. 286 (1949); Empresa
Siderurgica, S.A. v. Merced County, 337 U.S. 154 (1949); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State
Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946); A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S.
66 (1923); Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418 (1904).
15. 417 U.S. at 69.
16. Id. at 70.
17. Id. at 69.
18. Id. at 71.
19. Id at 69.
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it. As the following pages will argue, this situation could be alleviated
by applying a rule, sanctioned by the courts in recent cases, which
would place more emphasis on the certainty that goods will enter the
stream of commerce than on the mere fact that they were located
within the state on the day the tax was assessed.
An alternative to the mechanistic rule applied in Kosydar would
be to accept a bifurcated test such as that articulated by the Ohio
Supreme Court. Under such a rule, the immunity would attach if
there was delivery of the goods to a common carrier, or if there was
substantial certainty that the goods would be exported. If not, the
goods could be taxed with the mass of other goods in the state. Some
support for this proposition may be found in the case law.
In Empresa Siderurgica, S.A. v. Merced County"0 Justice Frank-
furter considered issues similar to those in Kosydar. In Empresa he
dissented from the Court's application of the Coe test because, as he
stated:
[A] mechanistic formula, whether derived from phrases in Coe v. Errol,
or elsewhere culled advances us little toward the solution of such a con-
crete problem.'
In Empresa, a South American company purchased a cement
plant located in Merced County, which was to be dismantled and
shipped to Colombia. On the tax date, 12 percent of the plant had
been shipped, 10 percent crated but not shipped, 34 percent disman-
tled but not crated and 44 percent remained intact. Merced County
levied taxes on the 88 percent remaining in the county. The company
paid the tax under protest and subsequently brought suit for recovery
of its payment. The Supreme Court affirmed a denial of recovery,
holding that the parts of the plant were not entitled to the immunity
from taxation under the Import-Export Clause because there was no
movement of them into the stream of export.
Justice Frankfurter was troubled by the rigid approach approved
by the Court. The plant, he wrote, might be considered to be an
organic whole, or merely the sum of its parts, with differing results.
If it were an organic unit, the immunity might attach.2 If not an
organic whole, but only the sum of separate parts, the immunity
would not apply.2 He cited with approval language found in Richfield
Oil Corp. v. State Board:24
the certainty that goods are headed to sea and that the process of exporta-
tion has started may normally be best evidenced by the fact that they
20. 337 U.S. 154, 157 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 158.
22. Id. at 161.
23. Id.
24. 329 U.S. 69, 82 (1946).
VOL. 5:157
IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE
have been delivered to a common carrier for that purpose. But the same
degree of certainty may exist though no common carrier is involved.
Later in his opinion he agreed with Justice Bradley in Coe that
"intent to export no matter how firm, is not by itself enough to confer
immunity,"25 but he did find, at least in certain factual situations,
that the mechanistic application of the rule in Coe would be inade-
quate. Such a situation exists when the certainty of export is clear
and the danger of diversion to domestic use non-existent.2
At least one California court has accepted this line of reasoningY
Montrose Chemical made a compound used in the preparation of
D.D.T. Concentrate, a chemical banned from use in the United
States.2 Under contract with the General Services Administration
and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Montrose
shipped the compound to another company for fabrication into Con-
centrate and packaging for overseas shipment. While in a warehouse
awaiting shipment, Los Angeles County levied a tax on the finished,
packaged chemicals. The trial court upheld the tax, while the Court
of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals noted that the D.D.T.
concentrate was committed to export as it had been packaged for
overseas shipment under contract with a particular purchaser and
could not be legally diverted to domestic use. Using tests enunciated
in other cases, 29 the court held "if the certainty of a foreign destina-
tion is plain, levying a tax is improper even though there is no deliv-
ery to a common carrier. '3
The point being made by Justice Frankfurter in Empresa and the
court in Montrose Chemical is that the Export test is one of reason,
not mechanical application. Where there is no likelihood of the taxed
item being diverted, it is already an export, notwithstanding lack of
actual physical entry into the stream of export. Therefore, the Consti-
tutional immunity should apply.
CRITICISM OF THE Coe AND Kosydar TEST
Justice Frankfurter and the Montrose court rejected applications
of the Coe test as it was applied by the Court in Kosydar. However,
a rule of such import and longevity ought not be discarded solely on
the basis of dissenting opinions and state court holdings, no matter
how persuasive. If, as is here the case, it can be shown that maintain-
25. 337 U.S. at 161.
26. Cf., Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, 337 U.S. 286 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
27. Montrose Chemical Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 243 Cal. App. 2d 300, 52
Cal. Rptr. 209 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1004 (1967).
28. 52 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
29. Hugo Neu Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. App. 2d 703, 50 Cal. Rptr.
916 (1966).
30. 52 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
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ing the rule fails to accomplish the intended result, then altering the
rule necessarily follows. Further, if it can be shown that the national
interest requires a different result from that obtained by the Court,
then reconsideration of the rule is necessary.
The Court says it adheres to the rule as laid down in Coe because
it serves to prevent ambiguity.3 This is not, however, the result.
When the expansiveness of the definition of stream of commerce
(under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3)2
is compared with the narrow interpretation given the stream of ex-
port, inconsistencies are clearly evident.
A recent example of this problem is found by comparing the
holding of Kosydar with that of Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman.
Allenberg, a Tennessee corporation, contracted with Mississippi
farmers, including Pittman, for the delivery of cotton to its Missis-
sippi warehouse without first qualifying to do business in Mississippi
by registering with the State. At the time for delivery, the market
price for cotton was higher than that specified in the contract and
Pittman refused to deliver. Allenberg brought suit in Mississippi for
damages and injunctive relief. The Mississippi Supreme Court sus-
tained Pittman's defense that failure to qualify to do business in the
state meant that the state's courts were not open to Allenberg.14
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that though
delivery of the cotton might seem like a wholly intrastate transaction,
in fact the events were part of the vast interstate system of cotton
delivery.3 5 The necessity of keeping the cotton in the warehouse
awaiting accumulation of the requisite amounts for shipment, rather
than defeating the interstate nature of the transaction, was "an inte-
gral first step"" in the system. In making this decision, the Court
stated:
[Dielivery of the cotton to a warehouse, taken in isolation, is an intra-
state transaction. But that delivery is also essential for the completion
of the interstate transaction. The cotton in the Mississippi sale, though
temporarily in a warehouse, was still in the stream of commerce. 7
Although the Court specifically states that it did not deal with
the "possible local tax incidents of these contracts,"" the analogy
31. 417 U.S. at 71.
32. "The Congress shall have the power: ... (3) To regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." See, e.g.,
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
33. 43 U.S.L.W. 4001 (1974).
34. Pittman v. Allenburg Cotton Co., 276 So. 2d 678 (1973).
35. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4003.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 4004.
38. Id. at 4005.
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between the cotton in Allenberg and the business machines in
Kosydar is striking. Delivery of NCR's machines to its warehouse was
an integral first step in its distributive system. It was dictated by
circumstances beyond NCR's control, much like the cotton in
Allenberg. Storage of the machines was "essential to the completion
of the [international] transaction."
The inconsistency of these two rulings is clear. Justice Rehnquist
makes note of this in his Allenberg dissent. 19 While the Court in
Kosydar hopes to prevent ambiguities, its holding there and in
Allenberg fail to establish clear, unequivocal guidelines.
Two methods are open to the Court to resolve this conflict. It can
narrow the scope of its rulings under the Commerce Clause, an un-
likely choice, or it can expand its interpretation of the meaning of
export. There are sound policy reasons for choosing the latter course
of action. At present the United States is suffering a persistent bal-
ance of trade deficit, caused in large part by the four-fold increase in
oil prices since the middle of 1973.10 To counter the massive outflow
of dollars to foreign oil producers it is necessary to generate continu-
ing exports, which requires goods and services produced in the United
States with a competitive edge over those of other nations. Manufac-
tured goods, which is the category under which business machines are
counted, are the country's second largest category of exports." Be-
cause NCR's profit margin on machines for export is only five per-
cent,42 it is prevented from absorbing the various taxes which must
therefore be passed on to NCR's foreign consumers in the form of
higher, less competitive prices.
Currently, Congress is grappling with the problems generated by
the outflow of American dollars in foreign investment. It is felt that
this phenomena costs American workers jobs and contributes to bal-
ance of payments difficulties. One method discussed for limiting the
capital outflow would be to limit the tax benefits obtained when
39. Id. at 4007 n.6. "Cases such as Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co ...
make it clear that the cotton stored in Mississippi is subject to state taxation. The
Court today leaves the tax standing but illogically deprives Mississippi of its sole
means of enforcement of the tax."
40. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 1974, at 4, col. 4. "Merchandise imports
exceeded exports by a seasonally adjusted $113 million last month. The November
deficit stemmed partly from . . . continued high prices for imported oil. Imports of
crude oil and petroleum [were] 185.3 million barrels, which cost $2.12 billion, sharply
higher than in November [1973] when the U.S. imported 215.8 million barrels of crude
oil and petroleum products at a cost of only $885.7 million. The November trade deficit
widened the total U.S. trade gap for the January-November period to a $2.43 billion
deficit, in contrast to a $768 million surplus in the year-earlier 11 months."
41. UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BusINESs 37
(1973).
42. 298 N.E.2d at 561.
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investing abroad. By closing tax loopholes, the argument goes, the
money will be used for domestic investment. 3 While this may or may
not be true, other alternatives, based on creating a favorable invest-
ment climate internally, are available.
One of these can be the easing of tax burdens on exports. If this
is done, producers may find it profitable to export from the United
States, rather than investing in production facilities in foreign coun-
tries. While the states or Congress may act in this area, it remains
the province of the Court, as the final arbiter of the Constitution, to
define when an article comes within the protection offered by the
Import-Export Clause. By applying the more flexible test presented
herein, the Court can ease this burden of business somewhat.
It has been said that the rationale behind the mechanistic Coe
rule is to balance the need for free exports with the need of the states
to raise revenue. 4 4 While the need of the states for revenue is great, it
must be said that even if taxes such as those in Kosydar were prohib-
ited, exports would remain substantial contributors to local revenue.
The states may tax the materials used in exports.45 They may tax
income earned on foreign sales. In the case of NCR this amounted to
nearly half of total revenues, over $800,000,000.46 The plant and
equipment used to manufacture exports are subject to property taxes.
The income of workers employed is taxable by the states. Clearly, the
argument that revenue from the taxation of finished products such
as the machines in Kosydar is needed by the states is without force.
CONCLUSION
As the court in Kosydar explains, exporters and the states must
have guidance concerning when a commodity does in fact become an
export. 47 Some of the decisions, following Coe, have set down this test
for determining an export: there must be certainty of export evi-
denced by some movement into the stream of export, usually indi-
cated by delivery of the goods to a common carrier.'4 Other cases have
recognized the restrictive nature of this test, and have used a more
rational rule which grants immunity to goods with substantial cer-
tainty of export or which have physically entered the stream of ex-
port. This rule, while requiring a factual determination, would be
more compatible with present day needs. These criteria are clear
enough to give the necessary guidance to exporters, the states and the
43. See, e.g., Patrick, supra this issue.
44. Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, 337 U.S. 286, 288; Comment,
International Trade-Taxation of Exports, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. AND POL. 140 (1973).
45. Cf., Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
46. NCR ANNUAL REPoRT, supra note 3.
47. 417 U.S. at 71.
48. See, e.g., A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66 (1923).
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courts, as well as liberal enough to provide a broad immunity, which
is in the national interest.
In Kosydar there was substantial certainty that the taxed goods
would be exported. Like the cotton in Allenberg, movement of NCR's
machines to the warehouse was the first step in a vast scheme of
international distribution. Providing them with the cloak of export
immunity is required by logic and economic reality.
Ian B. Bird

